We have two forthcoming publications developing a theory of reference in the framework of intention-based semantics, taking into account earlier work on the mental state of confused identity:

Referential Intentions: A Response to Buchanan and Peet
Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

The Edenic Theory of Reference
Inquiry.

Earlier we had published two articles on confusion and malapropisms and speech error:

A Gricean Theory of Malaprops [philpapers, doi]
Mind & Language

Confusion is Corruptive Belief in False Identity [philpapers, doi]
Canadian Journal of Philosophy

The project is also intended to uncover some of the historical roots of so-called ‘puzzle-driven semantics’. We have now published one paper which starts this work. One interesting aspect of this history is J.L. Austin’s gradual move from a Wittgensteinian, unsystematic investigation of linguistic puzzles, to a more systematic method of building theories of speech acts.

Wittgenstein’s Influence on Austin’s Philosophy of Language [philpapers, doi]
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, co-authored with Daniel W. Harris.